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FALL 1965]
THE CORESPONDENT ADULTERY STATUTE
IN A CONFLICT OF LAWS SETTING
By WALTER A. RAFALKOt
"This statute is not against public policy, but accords therewith, and tends
to assure a decent propagation of the human race; and, where the husband
from whom the divorce is obtained, on account oi his adultery, marries the
woman with whom it was committed, during the lifetime of the first wife,
such marriage is void.
Turney, J., in Owen v. Bracket,
75 Tenn. 444, 449 (1881).
I.
INTRODUCTION
B ASICALLY, we are a religious people.' As the quoted passage
intimates, the institution of marriage should be perpetual. It
reflects a divine precept of the Christian religion, promotes the best
interests of human happiness in the temporal order, fulfills the design
of the marital contract and achieves the objective of the parties enter-
ing into the marital state. Obviously, the purpose of any statute
prohibiting adultery is to preserve the sanctity of the marriage and,
ultimately, of society itself.
At the intrastate or domestic level, no problem arises. In the
states which have passed corespondent adultery statutes, the courts
have recognized that it is competent for the legislature of any state,
in furtherance of its public policy, to impose a disability upon its
citizens restricting their right to contract marriages with their
paramours. 2
However, at the interstate3 or foreign4 level, the decisions are
in conflict. Some courts feel that a statute banning marriage with an
adulterer applies only to residents of the state divorced by a decree
of the state of rendition and not to non-residents who are permitted
to remarry the corespondent,5 while other courts, under such a statute,
t B.S., 1942, St. Louis University; LL.B., 1947, Boston University; LL.M., 1953,
Georgetown University; J.D., 1965, John Marshall University; member of the Miss-
ouri, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Court Bars;
Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
1. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952), Mr. Justice Douglas sail:
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
2. Connor v. Connor, 6 Lac. Jur. 43 (1905).
3. In re Donlay's Estate, 280 App. Div. 37, 111 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1952).
4. Petition of Mayall, 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
5. Supra note 3.
(81)
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hold that a party divorced on the ground of adultery is under a personal
incapacity to marry the corespondent during the lifetime of the former
spouse and is incapable of marrying in a state which has an adultery
statute prohibiting such remarriages.6
This article attempts to examine the corespondent adultery
statute and some of the problems that might arise in a Conflict of
Laws case when a modern-day "woodchuck" marries his corespondent
in another state prohibiting such remarriages. While this action may
be shocking and reprehensible in our civilized society, it occurs more
frequently than one anticipates.
The term "Conflict of Laws" would include any case in which
the facts, occurrences or events have transpired in a state or country
and suit is brought in another, so that the domestic forum must choose
between the forum's law and the law of the place where the facts,
occurrences or events have happened before the domestic forum can
determine the substantive rights between the parties.7
The problem becomes very acute, especially when Wife No. 2
(W-2) applies for citizenship, letters of administration, a distributive
share of the estate, veteran's and social security benefits, or to estab-
lish the legitimacy of the children born of the marriage.8 For this
reason, the Conflict of Laws aspect of this problem demands further
study.
II.
THE CORESPONDENT ADULTERY STATUTE
The first state to pass a corespondent adultery statute was Pennsyl-
vania on March 13, 1815. Section IX of the Pennsylvania Act of 1815
provides:
That the husband or wife, who shall have been guilty of
the crime of adultery, shall not marry the person with whom the
said crime was committed during the life of the former wife or
husband: but nothing herein contained shall be construed to
extend to or affect or render illegitimate any children born of
the body of the wife during coverture.9
6. Supra note 4.
7. LEFLAR, THe LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (1959) ; RtSTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS, § 1 (1934).
8. Garcia v. Aguayo, 39 P.R.R. 82, affirmed, sub nom. Casals v. Fernandez, 40
F.2d 831 (1st Cir. 1930).
9. Act of March 13, 1850, P.L. 153, 6 Sm. L. 286, § 9; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§ 169 (1930).
[VOL. 11 : p. 81
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There are only two other states, Tennessee and Louisiana, which
have provisions basically identical with that of Section IX of the
Pennsylvania Act of 1815. Section 8452 of the Tennessee Code of
1938 provides:
When a marriage is absolutely annulled, or dissolved, the
parties shall severally be at liberty to marry again; but a defen-
dant who has been guilty of adultery shall not marry the person
with whom the crime or act was committed, during the life
of the former husband or wife."°
Article 161 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1932 states:
In case of divorce, on account of adultery, the guilty party
can never contract matrimony with his or her accomplice in
adultery, under the penalty of being considered and prosecuted
as guilty of the crime of bigamy, and under the penalty of nullity
of the new marriage; provided, however, that marriages con-
tracted in this or any other state prior to December 31, 1962
in contravention of this article but which are not invalid under
any other laws of this state shall be deemed valid."
Other states have statutes which permit the guilty party, under
certain circumstances, such as after three years have elapsed, to marry
the paramour.' 2 They do not perpetually enjoin the guilty party
from remarrying the corespondent. In Virginia, a court has the
power to decree that the guilty party shall not remarry the paramour,
but such a decree may be revoked at any time after the expiration
of a six-month period." Even the Territory of Puerto Rico imposes
10. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 36, § 831 (1955).
11. LA. CIv. COD. ANN. art. 161 (1952).
12. Chapter 14, Section 8, DOMESTIc RELATIONS LAW, McKinney's Consolidated
Laws of New York provides:
Whenever a marriage has been or shall be dissolved, the complainant may marry
again during the lifetime of the defendant. But a defendant for who se adultery
the judgment of divorce has been granted in this state may not marry again
during the lifetime of the complainant, unless the court in which the judgment of
divorce was rendered shall in that respect modify such judgment, which modifica-
tion shall be made only upon satisfactory proof that three years have elapsed
since the decree of divorce was rendered, and that the conduct of the defendant
since the dissolution of said marriage has been uniformly good; and a defendant
for whose adultery the judgment of divorce has been rendered in another state
or country may not marry again in this state during the lifetime of the com-
plainant unless three years have elapsed since the rendition of such judgment and
there is no legal impediment, by reason of such judgment, to such marriage in
the state or country where the judgment was rendered. But this section shall not
prevent the remarriage of the parties to an action for divorce.
13. Section 20-119 of the 1950 Virginia Code provides:
In granting a divorce for adultery, the court may decree that the guilty party
shall not marry again at any time; in which case, the bond of matrimony shall
be deemed not to be dissolved as to any future marriage of such party, or in any
prosecution on account thereof. But, for good cause shown, so much of any
3
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a five-year disability to contract marriage by the adulterous parties,
if this is the court's decree.14 In the remaining states and territories,
there are no express pronouncements on this issue.
III.
DOMESTIC MARRIAGE OF ADULTERERS
This first situation presents little difficulty to the courts. In this
hypothetical situation, both H and W reside in the same state. H is
divorced from W on the ground of adultery with C. Shortly after
the divorce, W and C are married in the same state. C dies and W
claims a distributive share of C's estate or other benefits. In Warren-
berger 'v. Folsom,"1 an action by W claiming mother's insurance
benefits for W and child's insurance benefits for the child under the
Social Security Act, it was held this statute imposes a personal in-
capacity to marry in any circumstances or at any time or in any place
as long as the injured party is living, and the prohibition of the
statute is not limited to ceremonial marriages alone but includes
those contracted in common law form and recognized by Pennsyl-
vania. Thus, W was not married legally to H-2 and was not his
widow so as to be entitled to mother's insurance benefits under the
Social Security Act, nor was her child born after W's divorce from
H-1 entitled to child's benefits under Pennsylvania law.
The prevailing view is that no legal rights can grow out of a
void marriage if contracted by adulterers during the divorced spouse's
lifetime.1"
However, in some instances the courts, while holding the marriage
of the adulterers invalid and the subsequent relationship meretricious,
recognize the civil effects of the marriage.' In Kimball v. Folsoni, as
another social security benefit case, the court held that 4/ had acted
in "good faith," was deemed to be a putative wife and entitled to
the civil effects of the marriage.
decree as prohibits the guilty party from marrying again, may be revoked and
annulled, at any time after the expiration of six months from the date of such
decree, by the same court by which it was pronounced.
14. Title 31, section 233(5) of the 1954 Civil Code of Puerto Rico provides: "Nor
can the following contract marriage with each other: 5. The parties to an adultery who
have been convicted by a final judgment for five years after such judgment."
15. 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956).
16. Bennett v. Anderson, 20 Tenn. App. 523, 101 S.W.2d 148 (1936) ; Jennings v.
Jennings, 165 Tenn. 295, 54 S.W.2d 961 (1932).
17. Lembcke v. U.S., 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Petition of Mayall, 154 F. Supp.
556 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; Succession of Pigg, 228 La. 799, 84 So. 2d 196 (1955) ; Succession
of Marinoni, 183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1936); Chandler v. Hayden, 159 La. 5, 105
So. 80 (1925) ; Jones v. Squire, 137 La. 883, 69 So. 733 (1915).
18. 150 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. La. 1957).
[VOL. 11 : p. 81
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FOREIGN MARRIAGE OF ADULTERERS
In the second hypothetical situation, both H and W reside in
the same state. H is divorced from W on the ground of adultery
with C. Shortly after the divorce, W and C are married in another
state where such marriages are not prohibited, solely for the purpose
of evading the local law, and return to the state of their domicile.
C dies and W claims some interest arising from the second marriage.
Much has been written on this aspect of the problem and the
law is apparently well settled. 9 This is especially true if some version
of the old "Uniform Marriage Evasion Act" has been adopted. This
Act had been adopted in five states.2" This Uniform Act prohibited
any person residing in the state, who was prohibited from contracting
marriage within the state, from going into another state or country
and there contracting a marriage prohibited by the laws of the domi-
ciliary state. If he did evade the laws of the domiciliary state, then
such marriage would be null and void for all purposes within the
domiciliary state. The District of Columbia,2' Indiana, 22 Maine,23
Mississippi,24 North Dakota, 25 Virginia 26 and West Virginia2 7 adopted
similar marriage evasion statutes. However, in 1943, the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws withdrew this Act, along with several
others, stating it tended to produce confusion in the law because only
a few states had passed it.
In Maurer v. Maurer,2  a libel for annulment of marriage, H
was divorced by W-1 in Pennsylvania on the ground of adultery with
C. H and C, the corespondent in the adultery charge, thereafter went
19. 27A C.J.S. Divorce, § 162 (1959) ; Legislative Symposium: The 1958 Regular
Session, 19 LA. L. REv. 52, 53 (1958) ; Louisiana Legislation of 1962: A Symnposiumn,
23 LA. L. REv. 41 (1962) ; Comment, Louisiana Law on the Nullity of Marriage,
20 LA. L. REv. 563, 574 (1960) ; Note, Foreign Marriages in Evasion of Local Statutes,
17 TENN. L. REv. 378, 389 (1942) ; Note, Domestic Relations - Putative Marriage -
Article 161, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, 32 TUL. L. Rgv,,O (1957).
20. ILL. REv. STAT. ANN., ch. 89, §§ 19-24 (1955) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN., §§ 9:221-
9:224 (1950); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 207, §§ 10-13, 50 (1955); VT. REv. STAT.,
§§ 3154-55 (1947) ; Wis. STAT., § 245.04 (1951).
21. D.C. CODE ANN., § 30-105 (1951).
22. IND. ANN. STAT., § 44-209 (Burns, 1952).
23. ME. REv. STAT. ANN., ch. 166, § 9 (1954).
24. MISS. CODE ANN., § 459 (1942).
25. N. DAK. REv. CODE, § 14-0308 (1943).
26. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 20-40, 20-44, 20-58 (1950).
27. W. VA. CODE ANN., § 4695 (1955).
28. 163 Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948). See Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625,
39 Atl. 16 (1898) ; Kline v. Kline, 43 York 114 (1929) ; Immendorf's Estate, 12 York
90, aff'd on another point, 190 Pa. 590, 42 At. 959 (1899).
FALL 1965]
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to Maryland and married. Following the marriage, they inmediately
returned to Pennsylvania where they lived together for nine years.
H then sued in Pennsylvania for annulment on the ground that the
marriage in Maryland was void under the Pennsylvania corespondent
adultery statute. The Pennsylvania court held that the Maryland
marriage was void and the annulment action proper.
In Penneger v. State,29 a prosecution for lewdness, H was divorced
from W on the ground of adultery with C in Tennessee. Shortly
after the divorce, W and C went to Alabama and were married,
returning the very next day to Tennessee. The Tennessee court upheld
the conviction, stating that the marriage was void in Tennessee,
although valid in Alabama, and was contrary to the public policy
of Tennessee.
In Rhodes v. Miller,0 a suit for annulment of a marriage, H
was married in Louisiana where H and W had resided. W sued for
and obtained a judgment for divorce on the ground of adultery with
C. H and C were married in Illinois for the purpose of evading the
corespondent adultery statute. Immediately after their marriage, they
returned to Louisiana. Later, H sought a judgment decreeing his
marriage with C to be null and void. The Louisiana court held that
a marriage contracted in violation of the prohibitory statute contra-
venes the policy of the law, is an absolute nullity, and is open to
attack as such.
That this is the Pennsylvania law in this situation appears to
be settled by the case of Stull's Estate,"a a denial of an application for
letters of administration, wherein the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
stated :
(1) That the foreign marriage is contrary to the positive
statute of the domicile; (2) that it is contrary to the public
policy of the government of the domicile, in that it offends
against the prevailing sense of good morals among the people
there dwelling; and (3) it was contracted for the express purpose
of evading positive law of the domicile, and it is therefore to be
regarded as a fraud upon the government and people of the
domiciliary residence. The combination of these three objections
seems to be most fatal to the validity of the marriage thus con-
tracted.32
29. 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305 (1889). See State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872)
Carter v. Montgomery, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 216 (1875).
30. 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938). See Succession of Knupfer, 174 La. 1048,
142 So. 609 (1932) ; Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907) ; Succession
of Hernandez, 46 La. Ann. 962, 15 So. 461 (1894).
31. 183 Pa. 625, 39 AtI. 16 (1898).
32. Id. at 632-33, 39 Ati. at 18.
[VOL. 11 : p. 81
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V.
FOREIGN LAW INHIBITING REMARRIAGE
Assume in the third hypothetical situation that both H and 4'
reside in another state. H divorces W on the grounds of desertion.
Shortly therafter, W marries C in the other state. The law of the
sister state provides that the offending party shall not be released
from the marriage contract but, if the offending party remarries, he
or she shall be subject to all the pains and penalties of bigamy. In
Dickson v. Dickson,33 a petition for dower of the real estate of C
whom W married in Tennessee, the court held that the law of Ken-
tucky, providing that the offending party shall not remarry after the
other party has obtained an absolute divorce, is of no force and effect
in Tennessee, where such marriages are not prohibited. No principle
of comity requires Tennessee to give force and effect to the penal
laws of Kentucky. Penal laws can have no extra-territorial effect and
W was lawfully married to C in Tennessee and is entitled to dower.
However, what if the marriage is prohibited by the state of the new
domicile of W and C? In Wagner v. Wagner,4 a libel for annulment
of a bigamous marriage by C against W, the court held that where
the states of New York and Pennsylvania have similar statutory
prohibitions imposing upon an adulteress, W, a personal disability
from marrying the corespondent, C, during the lifetime of the libellant,
H, and where a divorce decree is entered against the New York
respondent, W, on grounds of adultery, the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania will give full faith and credit to the New York decree and will
refuse to declare legal a purported common law marriage entered
into in Pennsylvania between the respondent, W, and corespondent, C,
and the decree of annulment was granted.
Suppose W resided in and was married to C in another state
or foreign country, which had no paramour statute. Would Pennsyl-
vania, Louisiana or Tennessee recognize the validity of such a
marriage if W and C subsequently moved to any one of these three
states? On the basis of comity and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the Constitution of the United States, 3 it would appear that such a
marriage would be valid. The general rule is that a marriage valid
33. 9 Tenn. 110 (1826).
34. 58 Montg. 18, aff'd, 152 Pa. Super. 4, 30 A.2d 659 (1942).
35. U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, § 1, provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.
7
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where solemnized is valid everywhere.3 6 California, 7 Idaho, S Kansas,3 9
Kentucky,4" Nebraska,41  New Mexico, 4 2 North Dakota, 43  South
Dakota," and Utah45 expressly declare by statute that a marriage
valid where contracted is valid everywhere. To this rule there is an
exception: "unless contrary to the prohibitions of natural law or the
express prohibitions of a statute."46 There are more specific grounds
for declaring marriages void by the state of domicile spelled out in
the Restatement.47
Thus, in In Re Mayall's Naturalization,48 a petition for naturaliza-
tion, the court stated:
Thus, if at the time petitioner [wife] was married in Penn-
sylvania, she resided in and was married in any territory or state
of the United States other than Pennsylvania, Louisiana or Tell-
nessee, such a marriage would have been valid and recognized
as such in every other territory or state, including the last named
States, and here moral character would never have been questioned
by the Naturalization Service on the ground that she married
and lived with her corespondent.
VI.
DOMESTIC LAW INHIBITING REMARRIAGE
The fourth hypothetical situation presents the greatest difficulty
and there are no decisions by the highest state courts on this subject
matter. There are, however, some lower court decisions which hold
the paramour prohibition statute applicable.49  Assume in the fourth
hypothetical situation that both H and W reside in another state.
H divorces W on the grounds of adultery. Shortly therafter, W
marries C in the other state. This other state has a statute which
imposes an absolute personal incapacity on the guilty party to a di-
vorce suit for adultery to remarry the corespondent during the life-
36. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 121 (1934).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN., § 63 (1954).
38. IDAHO CODE ANN., § 32-209 (1947).
39. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 23-115 (1949).
40. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN., § 402.040 (Baldwin, 1955).
41. NEB. REv. STAT., § 42-117 (1952).
42. N.M. STAT. ANN., § 57-1-4 (1953).
43. N.D. CODE ANN., § 14-0308 (1959).
44. S.D. CODE, § 14.0103 (1939).
45. UTAH CODE ANN., § 30-1-4 (1953).
46. Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N.Y. 602, 605 (1882).
47. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 131-32 (1934).
48. 154 F. Supp. 556, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
49. Id. at 559.
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time of the person who obtained the divorce. The issue arises as
to whether or not this is a valid marriage between W and C.
The cases are in conflict on this point. One school of thought
holds that the paramour statute is inapplicable when the remarriage
takes place in Pennsylvania, Louisiana or Tennessee." ° In In Re Don-
lay's Estate,"' a proceeding to vacate and set aside a Surrogate Court
decree granting letters of administration to W, the Surrogate denied
the motion of W to dismiss the petition, and W appealed. The
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held that W was H's widow
to whom letters of administration could be issued. In this case H,
divorced by a decree in New York, went to Pennsylvania and married
W, the corespondent, and then returned to New York and continued
to reside there until his death. The New York court held the Pennsyl-
vania statute prohibiting marriage of adulterer and paramour was
inapplicable because the Pensylvania statute applies only to residents
of Pennsylvania divorced for adultery by decree of a Pennsylvania
court.
In Nichols v. Buffalo Weaving and Belting Co.,52 a disability
compensation and death benefit claim under the New York Work-
men's Compensation Law, W, the claimant, married an employee, C,
in Pennsylvania in violation of the New York divorce decree which
prohibited her marriage within the lifetime of her husband, H. The
court held that W was the legal widow of C and could recover death
benefits under the compensation law. The court stated the Pennsyl-
vania statute was inapplicable in this case. There was no proof that
W was ever' convicted of the crime of adultery and the finding of
adultery by a court in a private civil action is not a substitute for a
judgment of conviction. In addition, there was no competent proof
in the record that C was the corespondent named in the divorce suit.
The one definite proposition of law which emerged from the case
of In re Palmer's Estate,53 is that the Pennsylvania statute which
prohibits a defendant who has been divorced on the grounds of adultery
from contracting a marriage with the corespondent will apply only
to a case in which the name or identity of the corespondent appears
in the findings, judgment, or the evidence of the divorce proceedings.
50. Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1950) ; In re Donlay's Estate,
280 App. Div. 37, 111 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1952) ; In re Palmer's Estate, 275 App. Div. 792,
90 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1949); Nichols v. Buffalo Weaving & Belting Co., 276 App. Div. 228,
94 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1949) ; Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 460 (1929) ; Thorp
v. Thorp, 90 N.Y. 602 (1882).
51. 280 App. Div. 37, 111 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1952).
52. 276 App. Div. 294, 94 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1949).
53. 275 App. Div. 792, 90 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1949) ; In re Donlay's Estate, 106
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The Pennsylvania statute does not prohibit a marriage to a
person other than the paramour. The Pennsylvania court stated in
In re Beegle's Estate14 that the Pennsylvania statute which forbids
a woman who has been divorced on the ground of adultery to remarry
during the life of the husband will not apply to a case where a woman
marries again but the record of the divorce proceedings shows no
adulterous conduct with the second husband prior to the divorce,
although such conduct is alleged in proceedings over the distribution
of the second husband's estate.
The Tennessee version of the statute was interpreted in Cole v.
Parton,5" a bill to have a later marriage declared void, where H was
divorced by W-1 on the grounds of desertion and remarried and
lived with W-2 until his death thirty-one years later. The court held
that the children of the first marriage could not attack the validity
of the second marriage on the grounds that H lived in adultery with
W-2 prior to being divorced by W-1 because H was divorced on
the grounds of desertion and not adultery.
The Louisiana statute was interpreted in Jones v. Floyd,56 a
suit for divorce, in which the court stated that the law does not
contemplate that a spouse at fault in the dissolution of one marriage
should be forever denied the privilege of entering into another, since
a wife has no legally recognized interest to defeat her husband's right
to remarry following divorce to which he is entitled by law upon a
ground other than adultery. This article prohibiting divorced persons
from marrying the accomplice in adultery under penalty of nullity
of new marriage applies only where the identity of the accomplice
appears in the record or in the evidence.
In Garcia v. Aguayo,57 the court pointed out that, for the annul-
ment of a canonical marriage contracted prior to the enactment of
the Spanish Civil Code because of the previous adultery of those
who contracted the marriage later, it is a condition precedent that
the adulterers had been convicted by final judgment, and, without
such judicial declaration and penal sanction, there was no incapacity.
The second school of thought holds that the paramour or accom-
plice statute is applicable when the marriage takes place in a pro-
54. 64 Pa. Super. 180 (1916).
55. 172 Tenn. 8, 108 S.W.2d 884 (1937); Plantt v. Plantt, 28 Tenn. App. 79,
186 S.W.2d 338 (1944).
56. 154 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 1963) ; Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430(1938) ; Succession of Knupfer, 174 La. 1048, 142 So. 609 (1932) ; Succession of
Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907) ; Succession of Hernandez, 46 La. Ann. 962,
15 So. 461 (1894).
57. 39 P.R.R. 82 (1929), aff'd sub non. Casals v. Fernandez, 40 F.2d 831 (1st
Cir. 1930).
(VOL. I11: p. 81
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hibited state and the marriage is invalid.5 8 In In re Mayall,59 a natural-
ization proceeding, the federal court, following the Erie doctrine,
held that the evidence established the good moral character of the
petitioner, W, during the five-year period preceding the filing of
her petition, even though under Pennsylvania law her marriage to C,
the man named as the corespondent in the British divorce decree on
the grounds of adultery, in that state during the lifetime of her former
husband would be invalid and the subsequent marital relationship
meretricious. The reason for so holding was that in most of the
other states such a marriage would have been valid.
In Allen v. Allen,60 a divorce action, the court used strong
language to point out that the prohibition of the statute declaring
that the spouse guilty of adultery cannot marry the corespondent is
not merely rhetoric; it imposes a personal incapacity on a respondent
to marry the person with whom the adultery was committed.
Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher,0 an annulment proceeding, holds
that under the Pennsylvania statute a marriage between a husband
and his corespondent in a former divorce action in which a divorce
decree was granted by a New York court, where both parties resided,
on the ground of adultery, is forbidden and such a marriage in Pennsyl-
vania is null and void and will be so declared by the Pennsylvania courts
even though neither party was a resident of Pennsylvania.
Young v. Young, 62 a libel for divorce, indicates that every libel-
lant, in a divorce action based on adultery, owes a high duty to the
Commonwealth. Wherever possible a corespondent should be named
and he or she and the respondent should be prohibited from nmarry-
ing each other during the lifetime of the libellant.
The above cases should be compared with Schofield v. Schofield
(No. 1),6s a divorce proceeding, where a marriage between first
cousins is not unlawful in Delaware, but is unlawful in Pennsylvania.
This Delaware marriage was held to be valid in Pennsylvania and not
incestuous, even though such a marriage celebration or ceremony is
not permitted in Pennsylvania. It was held that this statute was not
58. Petition of Mayall, 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; Rhodes v. Miller, 189
La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938) ; Succession of Knupfer, 172 La. 1048, 142 So. 609 (1912) ;
Succession of Gabisso, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907); Succession of Hernandez, 46
La. Ann. 962, 15 So. 461 (1894) ; In re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atd. 16 (1898) ;
Allen v. Allen, 165 Pa. Super. 379, 67 A.2d 629, 68 A.2d 465 (1949) ; Maurer v.
Maurer, 163 Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948) ; Schofield v. Schofield (No. 1),
51 Pa. Super. 564 (1912); Kalmbacher v. Kalmbacher, 63 Pa. D.&C. 195 (C.P.
Susquehanna County 1949) ; Young v. Young, 29 Erie 265 (1946) ; Penneger v. State,
87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305 (1889) ; State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872) ; Carter v.
Montgomery, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 216 (1872).
59. 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
60.. 165 Pa. Super. 379, 67 A.2d 629, 68 A.2d 465 (1949).
61. 63 Pa. D.&C. 195 (C.P. Susquehanna County 1949).
62. 29 Erie 265 (1947).
63. 51 Pa. Super. 564 (1912).
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intended to apply extra-territorially and is not against the strong
public policy, as the adultery statute is, in Pennsylvania, and forbids
the marriage relation to be contracted. The incest statute does not
make the marriage relation, the status of marriage, between first
cousins unlawful. It prohibits only the celebration of the marriage,
that is, the making of a marriage contract, in Pennsylvania, but not
in any other state.
Would dire results follow if the courts struck down as void a
marriage between the guilty party and his or her paramour? What
effect would this have on the legitimacy status of the children born
of a void or voidable marriage in one of these states prohibiting such
marriages? The effect would not necessarily be deleterious - the
only ones that will be affected are the guilty spouses and not children
born of such a marriage. The Louisiana statute provides:
Art. 158. Rights of children of the marriage.
Art. 158. This separation or divorce shall not in any case
deprive the children born of the marriage of any of the advan-
tages which were secured to them by law, or by the marriage
contract of their father and mother; but there is no right to any
claim on the part of such children, except in the manner and
under the circumstances where such claims would have taken
place, if there had been no separation.6 4
The Pennsylvania statute states:
§ 169.1 Void or voidable marriages; children; legitinmacy.
In all cases where a supposed or alleged marriage is con-
tracted, which is absolutely void by reason of one of the parties
thereto having a spouse living at the time of the supposed or
alleged marriage, or if for any other lawful reason the said
marriage was void or voidable when contracted, all children born
of such parties shall be deemed the legitimate children of both
parties for all purposes."'
The Tennessee statute declares:
36-832 Legitimacy of children. - The annulment or dis-
solution of the marriage shall not in any wise affect the legitimacy
of the children of the same.66
The language of the Louisiana and Tennessee statutes is very
similar in providing that the legitimacy of children shall not be
64. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 158 (West, 1952).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169.1 (1964).
66. TENN. CODE ANN., § 36-832 (1955).
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affected by annulment or dissolution of the marriage. However, this
statute is not limited in its application to cases where there is an
annulment or divorce by decree of court, but applies equally to those
cases where parents do not seek such relief, since the statute was
enacted for the benefit of the children of a marriage annulled or dis-
solved and to protect them as the innocent persons involved.67 The
court of Tennessee indicated in Taliaferro v. Rogers,18 a suit to
assert title to real property, that the statute providing that annulment
or dissolution of a marriage shall not affect the legitimacy of children
affords protection to the children and thus is designed to protect
the issue of marriages which are void ab initio.
Since conflicting views exist concerning the status of a marriage
between the paramour and the accomplice in the situation involving
non-residents, the better view must be determined The overwhelming
number of cases appears to favor the declaration of such marriages
between the respondent and corespondent as null and void. 9 The
rationale for this position is grounded in public policy. Fundamentally,
it was designed to prevent collusive and feigned divorces to evade the
purposes of the divorce law. Since a divorce on the grounds of adultery
may be readily obtained in any one of these states, it would be a
simple thing for the wrongdoing spouse to commit adultery to evade
the statutory prohibition. This prohibition against the marriage of the
paramour and the accomplice in an adultery situation serves as a
deterrent to those who would simulate an act of adultery for the sole
purpose of expediting a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. Indeed, even
if the act of adultery is not fabricated, the paramour statute serves
as a bulwark supporting the determined public policy of the state not
to give legal sanction to what is at best a meretricious relationship
between the evildoers."'
As the federal court pointed out in the case of In re Mayall:
. . . .we earnestly believe that a Pennsylvania court of state-
wide jurisdiction would hold that the personal incapacity to marry
imposed by § 9 is applicable to all guilty parties marrying the
corespondent within the confines of Pennsylvania regardless of
where the divorce was obtained."
67. Diehl v. Jones, 170 Tenn. 217, 94 S.W.2d 47 (1936); Taliaferro v. Rogers,
35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835 (1951) ; Duggan v. Ogle, 25 Tenn. App. 467, 159
S.W.2d 834 (1941). Cf. Maunier v. Coutejean, 45 La. Ann. 419, 12 So. 623 (1893).
See 7 AM. JUR. Bastards, § 7 (1937) ; Annot.: 84 A.L.R. 499 (1933) ; 10 C.J.S.
Bastards, § 2C (1938).
68. 35 Tenn. App. 521, 248 S.W.2d 835 (1951).
69. Supra note 58.
70. Young v. Young, 29 Erie 265 (1946).
71. 154 F. Supp. 556, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
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There is no dispute that adultery is an indignity of the worst
sort and, if it was not controlled by the legislature, civilly and crim-
inally, it would destroy our society as it now exists. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the state legislatures have made this act a
ground for divorce and have prescribed a procedure permitting the
dissolution of the marital bond to protect the injured spouse. Further,
the legislatures have implemented the aforementioned divorce statute
by preventing the one guilty of adultery from marrying his corespon-
dent, paramour or accomplice.
While there exists some doubt as to the legislative intent that
the statute should have an extra-territorial effect, the majority of
the courts state that the act imposes a personal incapacity on the re-
spondent to marry the person with whom the adultery was committed
whether they be residents or non-residents.
For this reason, the paramour should be clearly named in the
libel, if possible, and the paramour named in the libel as corespondent
should be given adequate notice of the charge, with the opportunity
for a fair hearing to disprove the falsification, if possible. This would
be a matter of record in the original divorce proceedings and would
enable a party to marry a person other than the paramour.
To remove the ambiguity that presently exists in the statutes,
the legislatures should spell out that the statute will have an extra-
territorial effect in a Conflict of Laws case, and such marriage, within
or without the state, will definitely be declared null and void. Unless
this is done, the wrongdoers, the respondent and corespondent, run
a serious risk when they marry in Louisiana, Pennsylvania and
Tennessee.
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